Looking at the assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and developments in South Sudan in recent months, it is clear that the agreement is lagging behind due to unincorporated (or newly constituted) bodies and the inability of established bodies to function. While some bodies – such as the NPTC, the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (RJMEC) and the Mechanism for Monitoring and Evaluation of Transitional Ceasefire and Security Agreements (CTSAMVM) – were established in a timely manner, as defined by the R-ARCSS, many others were not established in the TPP until much later. Key institutions with serious security implications – such as the Joint Defense Council (JDB), the Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) and the Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) – were only established at the end of November 2018, when they should have been established within two weeks of the signing of the agreement.8 According to IGAD`s latest report on the RJMEC in December 2018, two institutions remained outstanding: the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDA) and the Independent Boundary Commission (IBC). These three measures, which are considered violations of the R-ARCSS on several levels, serve to further undermine trust between the parties to the agreement. Similarly, they undermine public trust – if at all – in the commitment of political actors to change South Sudan`s path to peace. Despite the potential obstacles that may thwart the implementation of the R-ARCSS, there are a significant number of factors that will ensure that the agreement achieves its overarching goal of providing a foundation for a united, peaceful and prosperous South Sudan. Another potential obstacle is the apparent lack of urgency, determination, political will and political commitment in implementing even the lightest objectives of the peace agreement. The previous challenge is related to the agreement`s failure to address some of the root causes of the conflict in South Sudan. The most serious causes of the conflict, as also indicated in the 2014 final report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, include the lack of strong democratic institutions and the continued fusion of personal, ethnic and national interests, as well as the unfair distribution of resources in South Sudan.10 Chapter 1 Provisions on transitional institutions and mechanisms.
and the provisions of chapter 4 on resource, economic and financial management – which jointly aim to address some of the root causes of the conflict – have long been enshrined in previous peace agreements, but have not brought about any changes. R-ARCSS mediators needed to understand why this was the case and develop more innovative and creative interventions. After its launch in December 2017, the HLRF managed to facilitate several negotiations over 15 months between the Sudan People`s Liberation Movement and the Government Army (SPLM/A-IG) of President Salva Kiir Mayardit, the Sudan People`s Liberation Movement and the Opposition Army (SPLM/A-IO) of Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon and other opposition political parties, which eventually resulted in the R-ARCSS. The R-ARCSS was preceded by five important agreements between the parties and actors of the conflict in South Sudan: This major divergence within the R-ARCSS regarding the role of Sudan and Uganda is perhaps best captured by Mahmood Mamdani. He explains that the R-ARCSS is an agreement between Sudan and Uganda – “Mr. Bashir and Mr. Museveni are the guarantors of the agreement” – and by recognizing them as such, the R-ARCSS paves the way for South Sudan to become “an informal protectorate” of both neighbors.4 While this is a glimpse with potentially important implications for South Sudan`s future, the recognition of the stakes the two neighbors have in Juba, and the power that such recognition gives them, indicates the possibility that this peace agreement will be “different” and perhaps “hold” differently. It remains to be seen to what extent this possible different outcome could be described as “peace”. The main parties and signatories of the R-ARCSS are Kiir as Chairman of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU); Machar of SPLM-IO; Deng Alor Kuol of splm-former detainees (SPLM-FDS); and Gabriel Changson Chang of the South Sudanese Opposition Alliance (SSOA). .